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Michael Martinek [*]
The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in Private International Law -
The German and
the Swiss Experience with the Codification of Conflicts Law Rules
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 The codification developments
2.1 The codification of private international law
in Germany
2.2 The codification of private international law
in Switzerland
3 Comparative aspects and questions
3.1 The outer appearances: two unequal sisters
3.2 The quest for common experiences
4 The Savignyan approach
4.1 The fundamental soundness of Savigny’s
4.2 The awareness of the deficiencies
of the Savignyan approach
5 The discussion about a “conflicts revolution”
5.1 The aberration of a political approach
5.2 No escape to lex fori and no “better
6 Refinement and flexibility
7 The “second pillar” of private international law
7.1 Mandatory intervention norms of civil law
7.2 The path to recognition
7.3 Universal conflict rules for the intervention
8 Conclusions
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1 Introduction
Whoever considers the codification of one’s private
international law these days will most unlikely sit just down and compile a
first draft referring to the country’s judge-made law and the accompanying
scholarly writing. The desirablility, feasibility and the conceptual framework
of a codification of a nation’s law of conflict of laws can hardly in any
country be satisfactorily assessed without taking into account the experiences
of other countries which have already marched forward on this path. Since
presently the idea of a codification of private international law of China is
very much under debate [1], my contribution will
let you share some views and thoughts on the codification experience that the
private international laws of Germany - my native country where I live and work
- and of Switzerland - my favorite holiday resort - have gained. The reason
why I chose the private international law of those countries is not only
personal affection and familiarity; it is the conviction that the expriences
Germany and Switzerland have made when codifying their laws of conflict of laws
are in many respects paradigmatic for the state of the art (and nobody will deny
that we are dealing here with an art).
2 The codification developments
2.1 The codification of private international law in
Germany
The German private international law is today codified in the
Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Buergerlichen
Gesetzbuch), abreviated: EGBGB. [2] This is
certainly true with regard to conflict rules of the law of persons, the family
law, the law of succession, the law of contractual and non-contractual (legal)
obligations as well as the law of property. This dates back to the very
beginning of the 20 th century, when, on January 1, 1900, the Civil
Code with its five books entered into force. The private international law
provisions of the Introductory Act (EGBGB) have sometimes been called the
“sixth book” or the “private international law book” of
the German Civil Code. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the codification of
conflict rules was, from the outset, directly linked with the codification of
general private law, and that the codified private international law could,
together with the German Civil Code, the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB),
celebrate its hundredth anniversary recently.
It is to be conceded, however, that this codification, namely
the artt. 7 to 31 of the former EGBGB, was, for almost ninety years, a very
fragmentary and scattered one. In particular, the private international law in
the Introductory Act consisted mainly of unilateral conflict rules which were
only construed and extended to universally applicable rules by court decisions
and doctrinal developments, which happened already before the second world war.
The sources of private international law in Germany were for a long time more
customary than statutory in nature. There were in fact few fields in German law
where scholarly writing and judicial decision-making played a comparatively
important role like in the private international law. The most remarkable
achievement is perhaps the extension of unilateral conflict rules to
multlateral, universal rules. After the Second World War repeatedly the proposal
for a new and more elaborate codification of the private international law in
Germany came up, especially when, in the seventies, some of the existing
provisions were held unconstitutional by the
courts. [3] This led to various drafts during the
following decades. [4] After a long and changing
history the German private international law [5]
in the Introductory Act gained its present shape mainly through two reform acts,
which had entered into force on September 1,
1986 [6] and on June 1,
1999 [7], respectively, and which were based on
two European Conventions. [8] The first Convention
aimed at the harmonisation of the international law of contractual obligations
(obligations ex contractu), whereas the second dealt with non-contractual
obligations (obligations ex lege), i.e. negotiorum gestio,
unjust enrichment and delicts, as well as with the international law of
property. These conventions which have been signed and ratified by the member
states of the European Union, provide for lois uniformes with regard to
the conflict rules covered therein. Moreover, many formerly scattered provisions
stating special conflict rules in several other statutes, e.g. the
Statute on Timesharing-Rights or the Statute on Unfair Contract Terms, have
lately been incorporated into the Introductory Act. There are only few dispersed
statutes left which contain additional conflict rules like the Statute on
Restriction of Trade and Competition. It is fair so say that at the beginning of
the new millenium the German private international law is moulded into a
codification-like set of provisions in the artt. 3 to 46 of today’s EGBGB,
most of which are now universal conflict rules in full harmony with the
pertinent rules of the other European Union member
states. [9]
This codification of conflicts rule determining the applicable
law omits from its scope, however, questions of jurisdiction and of enforcement
of foreign judgements. The pertinent rules are provided mainly in the German
Code of Civil Procedure, in the Brussels Convention (1968) and the Lugano
Convention (1988) on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and
Commercial Matters.
2.2 The codification of private international law in
Switzerland
Switzerland has enacted the Federal Statute on Private
International Law on December 18, 1987 which entered into force on January 1,
1989. [10] Up to 1989 Switzerland solved most of
the conflicts law issues by referring to a federal statute of 1891 on the civil
law relations of settlers and residents, the
NAG. [11] This statute with 40 articles aimed,
however, primarily at conflict cases of jurisdiction and of laws raised among
the different cantons of Switzerland’s federation and was restricted to
questions of the law of persons, family law and the law of succession. Since the
coming into force of the Swiss Federal Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch, ZGB) and the
Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, OR) in 1912, by which the Swiss Federation
availed itself of its power in all fields of civil law, the intercantonal law of
conflicts lost its genuine objectives, but retained and increased its importance
for international conflict situations where the provisions were applied by way
of analogy. There were no provisions on the international law of property and
the international law of obligations, nor were there any regulations on the
general part of private international law. Since the NAG referred to the law of
the canton of domicile of a Swiss resident, the principle of domicile was also
guiding the analogous application on international conflicts, whereas most of
the neighbour countries then favoured the nationality principle – as did
Germany. The NAG did not encompass contracts and delicts; insofar case law
governed the resolution of conflict cases.
It is clear that under those circumstances the new Swiss
private international law code of 1987, the IPRG, was greeted as a giant step
forward. This admirable piece of legislation appears as an all-inclusive
codification in 12 chapters and some 200 articles
(“Gesamtkodifikaton” [12]). It is
considered the most elaborate and detailed private international law
codification in the world. Today the Swiss private international law code serves
as model for many codification projects in other countries, among them the
Peoples’ Republic of China. [13] The main
feature of this codification is that it encompasses not only the conflict rules
determining the applicable law, but also the provisions on conflict of
jurisdictions and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
3 Comparative aspects and questions
3.1 The outer appearances: two unequal sisters
The private international laws of Germany (EGBGB) and
Switzerland (IPRG) thus have been tamed in a process which lasted several
decades. This process has entailed two fairly comprehensive codifications which
cover most of the law of conflict of laws in both countries, although some
important questions have been omitted, especially with regard to the general
part of private international law (e.g. there are no provisions on
characterization, premilinary questions or fraus legis). These
codifications belong, from a comparative lawyer’s perspective, to the same
“circle” or “family” of legal systems, namely to the
Germanic family of laws; they are both daughters or sisters of the Germanic
system - despite some admixtures of the Romanic legal system in the Swiss law.
In everyday’s life one can frequently encounter that the parents of two
daughters utter their amazement about how dissimilar and unlike their children
look and behave. And indeed, telling from their outer appearances the two
codifications of private international law in Germany and Switzerland seem to be
fairly different with regard to their structure and composition. They appear as
two unequal sisters.
The German EGBGB confines itself to the issue of the
applicable law, i.e. to the private international law in the narrower
sense of conflict rules, whereas the Swiss IPRG covers also international
conflict of jurisdictions (some 60 articles) as well as recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgements (some 30 articles); moreover, international
arbitration, intellectual property and international bankruptcy are also being
dealt with in the IPRG. The German rules on the law of natural persons, family
law and succession are based on the principle of nationality, whereas the Swiss
codification adheres to the domicile principle. The German law incorporates some
international conventions while others are left unmentioned; the Swiss code
expressly refers to all pertinent multilateral treaties which have introduced
private international law rules of general application ( lois uniformes)
into the national system. [14] The
renvoi-problem, i.e. the question of how to treat a reference of
foreign conflicts law back to the law of the forum state or to the law of a
third state, is treated differently in both codifications. German courts are
required, according to art. 4 EGBGB, to recognize a renvoi: The German reference
to foreign law includes the foreign substantive as well as conflicts law,
whereas a foreign reference to German law is considered to be a reference to
German substantive law only. The Swiss IPRG excludes, in principle, renvoi,
allows, however, for exceptions and tries to avoid dogma in its articles 13 and
14. In fact, many rules in the general part and in the various special parts of
the private international laws here and there differ quite remarkably.
3.2 The quest for common experiences
In our context there is little use in drawing up a synopsis
showing the many differences and enlisting the few common features of the two
private international law codifications regarding the actual contents of the
provisions. The decisive question is, in our context, whether there are any
common features of the two “unequal sisters”, stemming perhaps from
common experiences. Of course, no trifling matters or petty coincidences here
and there, but only truly fundamental points are of interest, “concurring
opinions”, so to speak, with regard to the ratio decidendi. Are
there not any corresponding results, any conform outcomes of the long-lasting
codification process in Germany and Switzerland? Well, there are, indeed. One
can well point out that there are seven fundamental and important common
experiences that deserve utmost attention.
4 The Savignyan approach
4.1 The fundamental soundness of Savigny’s
approach
It can well be considered a first common experience of both
countries in their private international law codification process that the
conceptual conflicts law approach which is linked with the name of Carl
Friedrich von Savigny forms, in principle, a sound and sturdy fundament. It
is obvious that both private international law systems are deeply rooted in this
doctrinal thought. As is well known, Savigny, in the eighth volume of his
treatise on the system of today’s Roman law (System des heutigen
Römischen Rechts), published in 1849, and in recourse to earlier studies of
his fellow countryman Carl Georg von Wächter and, more importantly,
of the American scholar Joseph Story, has laid down the foundations of
the classical private international law. According to Savigny, in the
case of a “collision of statutes” (“Collision der
Gesetze”) the primary task should be to search for the (geographical)
“seat” of a legal relationship according to its characteristic
nature. [15] From this starting point on, the
private international law developed as a “pure“ law of conflict of
laws (“Kollisionsrecht”) which did not even claim to regulate social
conflicts with normative provisions, but was inherently restricted to the
determination of the applicable law by just stating conflict rules.
Before Savigny, as is also well known, the so-called
“theory of statutes” (Statutentheorie) with the differentiation
between statuta personalia, statuta realia and statuta
mixta had been prevalent for hundreds of years in the wake of the
postglossators Baldus and Bartolus, according to whom conflict
cases had to be resolved by determining the territorial scope of the national
statutes and by reflecting on the state’s sovereign interests in an
application. This public law approach of the statutists was based on and
restricted by the recognition of foreign law on one’s own territory
according to the comitas gentium, the principle of friendliness of
peoples.
After the “Kopernikanian
turn” [16] launched by Savigny,
private international law was merely a neutral law of application of law
(“Rechtsanwendungsrecht”) seeking and determining the applicable law
for the private persons involved in a private legal relationship, hereby taking
consciously into account that the determination ends up in a “leap into
the dark” ( Rabel) [17], since the
actual substantive content of the law to be applied was not discussed nor
considered. This approach confined itself to pursueing the ideal of an
international decision harmony, i.e. a conformity of judgements in
conflict cases independantly form the forum state. In this spirit many
unilateral conflict rules of the former German and Swiss private international
law which were shaped to determine and declare the applicability of the German
or, respectively, the Swiss substantive law in cases of foreign elements, have
been extended, by doctrinal and judicial promotion, to universal conflict rules
which also could declare a foreign law applicable. This development shows that
Savigny’s national approach ist also supranationally orientated in
that it strives for an equal, evenly matched, undiscriminatory application of
foreign law.
It is here, by the way, that comparative law comes into play
rendering an inevitable working tool for the private international lawyer,
because the comprehension and classification of foreign legal institutions and
of the notions of a foreign legal system in the light of the conceptual
categories of the forum state, namely the problem of characterization, can
hardly be dealt with in the absence of a reliable knowledge of foreign law and
comparative legal methods. Comparative law and private international law closely
co-operate in pursueing the task to surmount the diversities of the national
legal systems at least partly by way of approximation, harmonisation or
conformity of judgements. [18] It is the
Savigynan approach which accounts for the close connection between
private international law and comparative law in both Germany and Switzerland.
Summing up the first common experience of both countries in their private
international law codification process it can be recorded that the
Savignyan approach is the theoretical starting point in which both
codifications are firmly rooted. In Germany Savigny was, in 1982,
expressly called “protector and at the same time renewer” of private
international law (“Bewahrer und zugleich
Erneuerer”). [19]
4.2 The awareness of the deficiencies of the Savignyan
approach
The second common experience of Germany and Switzerland in
their private international law codification process is that the Savignyan
approach also reveals some obvious deficiencies and weaknesses. It provides
for a sound fundament of the law of conflict of laws only in principle,
but remains in some respects unsatisfactory and leaves ample room for
improvements.
The catchword for the feeling of uneasiness has already been
mentioned: the “leap into the dark” left many private international
lawyers discontented, the more so since the deficiencies of said “leap
into the dark” could not sufficiently be mitigated by the refined
instruments of characterization and approximation, ordre public and teleological
reduction.
The uneasiness is certainly comprehensible: The technical
rules on conflict of laws in the former partial codifications of the German
EGBGB and of the Swiss NAG had been shaped in the spirit of the 19th
century which was the age of natural sciences where all sorts of attempts were
made to design social and conceptual phenomena, by way of analogy, like physical
or mechanical structures. This positivistic national private international law
allowed for the development of a system which was, theoretically,
internationally consistent and was based on the equality of all the other legal
orders. No doubt, it could unfold a certain intellectual fascination and appeal,
because everything worked so nicely together like in a clockwork. And yet,
deficiencies and imperfections arose as soon as the national private
international law of other states with their conflict rules deviated due to
different connecting factors. An international understanding about a
harmonization of the national laws of conflict of laws remained highly
fragmentary. To make it short: reality did not fit. The fundamental dilemma of
private international law thus was unresolved: How can one cope with
international cases by employing the imperfect means of the national law which
eventually always reflects the national legal notions? The axiom of equality of
legal orders is connected with the fiction of their homogeinity, whereas deeply
rooted cultural and political peculiarities govern in reality.
At the beginning of the theory of statutes, in the outgoing
12 th century, the glossator Magister Aldricus answered the
question for the applicable law simply by the characterization: “quae
potior et utilior videtur" [20] (which seem to
be mightier and more usefull); the classical private international law of
Saviny’s provenance, however, confined itself to the determination
of the geographically “best” law, irrespective of its content, and
employed only the ordre public as a correction. It was a schematic and
“blind” instrument for the determination of the applicable
substantive law. Substantive justice was out of the scope of the conflict rules.
In the liberal tradition of Savgny’s private international law, the
private legal order is in principle conceptualized as an area free of state
influence. Only in exceptional and especially justified cases could the state
intervene in the interactions of the private subjects. The notion of a
regulatory state which pursues certain objectives of social and economic policy
was fairly foreign; and so was the thought that the state was responsible to
protect private autonomy and its conditions of existence against its inherent
tendencies to self-destruction. The issue of what the ethical background and the
substantial objectives of private international law were, was on the
table [21] and caused increasing embarrassment,
although nobody wanted to return behind the „Kopernikanian turn“ of
Savigny. [22]
Of course, attempts were made to equip the private
international law with a substantive justification and legimitation of its own.
In particular, the idea emerged that there were specific common interests or
interests of the parties, which could be considered characeristic to the tasts
of private international law and which could be taken into account when
construeing conflict rules. [23] Those attempts
to endow private international law with a justice of its own failed eventually.
The explicit notion of a specific conflicts justice to be seperated from the
substantive law justice gained only partly support. It was commonly felt that a
merely formal and purely “geographical justice” was a contradiction
to the indivisibility of justice.
To resume: as the second common experience of Germany and
Switzerland in the private international law codification process it can be
ascertained that there was a wide spread dissatisfaction with the formal and
mechanical function of the Savignyan private international law which was
- except for the ordre public reservation - only “referring law”
(Verweisungsrecht), but not “deciding law”
(Entscheidungsrecht) [24] ; it lacked the
capability to finally resolve disputes.
5 The discussion about a “conflicts revolution”
5.1 The aberration of a political approach
As the third common experience which Germany and Switzerland
have made in their private international law-codification process one can
mention the wrongfulness of a decidely and expressly political approach like the
governmental interest analysis approach
( Currie) [25] which once was fashionable
in the U.S.A. This experience dates back to the sixties and seventies of the
last century. Those were the times where some German and Swiss writers tried to
import a “revolution” or a change of paradigm in the private
international law doctrine. The movement had commenced in the Anglo-american
doctrinal thought on private international law. The discussion in the U.S. after
the war had brought forth new approaches which quiet radically departed from
Savigny’s and Story’s theorems and had found resonance
in the court decisions in interlocal conflict cases. After the customary
time-lag of about ten years which characterises the trans-atlantic
jurisprudential communication, thoses „unconventional US-American analyses
and suggestions" [26] also gained foothold in
Europe. They were recepted in Switzerland [27]
before they found widespread attention in Germany. The discussion among the
schools of the American "conflicts revolution", which was linked with names like
Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Cavers, Weintraub, von Mehren or
Trautmann, irritated the Swiss and German traditionalists for almost two
decades. Also Friedrich K. Juenger played quite an important role. The
Americans felt quite free to connect value judgements with the previously
strictly formal conflicts rules. Not only in exceptional cases but as a
self-evident rule were they willing to let substantive legal considerations
influence the decision about the applicable law – according to the motto
"look before you leap" ( De Nova). [28]
The sympathy for and reception of those new ideas in Germany
and Switzerland, particularly of the governmental interest analysis approach as
perhaps the most prominent among these various and heterogeneous ventures, was
based on the impression that the classical and tradional law of conflict of laws
could not satisfactorily comply with the functions of the law as an instrument
of societal and economical order. [29] Already
in the middle of the last century, when a certain uneasiness with the
Savignyan system of private international law had emerged, the slogan of
a „crisis of conflict of laws“ had come
up. [30] The one or other scholar dared to
frankly plead for directly substantive law oriented solutions of conflict
cases. [31] The so-called “political
school” of private international law in the sixties and seventies - with
Wiethölter and Joerges as protagonists - wanted to treat the
modern civil law from the outset as instrument of social engeneering and
political steering instead of a means for the protection and balance of private
interests. Private international law, according to this view, had the task to
solve conflicts mainly between the colliding interests of two or more (not:
parties, but: ) states to apply and push through their poltical values
and their social order in cases with foreign elements. This perspective clearly
shifts the center of gravity in the decision about the applicable law from
considerations of private law to those of public law and, in particular, to
national oder governmental interests. Some writers ( Wiethölter,
Joerges) expressly demanded to treat questions of the private international
law as political questions. [32] They could not
find acceptable the old idea of a harmony of decisions and of a “formal
justice”, since justice, in their view, could not be seen as being
abstract from values, purposes and interests.
In Germany and Switzerland - as in many other countries - we
know today that this political approach of private international law, although
it contained an element of truth, was not suitable to abolish and to remove the
Savignyan fundament. In calling for a radical departure from
Savigny and for a “revolution” of private international law,
this approach was a “aberration”
(Irrweg). [33] It was not by accident that this
thought gained territory during the phase of Keynesian economic policy
where the understanding of civil law was quite generally inspired by political
dirigism and governmental controll. Today, in the years of globalisation and
deregulation, we witness again an enhanced awareness of the importance of an
indeterminated self-organization of the civilian society. The private
international law traditionalists and representativs of the classical doctrine
- like Jayme, Kegel, Neuhaus, Lorenz or
Schurig[34] - have successfully
isolated the opinion leaders of the political school. The notion of private law
and of private international law a instruments of public policy has been
rejected and the deliberate weakening of individual legal positions has been
stopped. The main objective of the political school, namely a radical new
orientation of private international law, eventually failed, although in some
fields like international labor law [35] or
international consumer protection law [36] their
arguments still linger on.
The private international law codifications which are in force
today in Germany and in Switzerland rightfully neglect or even ignore (if not
rebutt) the political approach. The political school of private international
law is today regarded as a step backwards into the direction of a destructive
politisation and towards a medieval
neo-statutism. [37] In fact, there is no
reliable and generally consented standard in existance for the assessment of
governmental interests in the application of law. All attempts of a public law
foundation of private international law have failed during the centuries. Apart
from the comitas gentium doctrine and the ordre public reservation there
is very little room for political considerations in the cases of conflict of
laws, if one wants seriously prevent uncertainty and
arbitrarines. [38] The most important
governmental interest of all states can only be certainty and conformity of the
decisions in different jurisdictions, and this task can at best be pursued by
the ways and means of classical private international law of Savigny’s
provenance. The idea to replace the classical system of conflict rules by a
list of vage policy considerations or by a catalogue of governmental interest -
be it on a case-to-case-basis, be it in a general set of norms - is no viable
alternative. A system of objective and specific conflict rules with standardized
connecting factors ( points de rattachement) and clear exceptions are in
both countries deemed preferable to open deliberations. Policy considerations
can only be the exception, but not the rule in private international
law.
5.2 No escape to lex fori and no “better
law”-approach
The fourth and the fifth experience, which the German and the
Swiss conflicts law theories share, are again of a negative, defensive or
repulsive nature, namely: neither the resort to the lex fori nor to a
allegedly “better law” is a promising relief. Influenced by the
Austrian-American scholar Albert Ehrenzweig, the suggestion has been
discussed among German and Swiss private international law theorists to mitigate
the dissatisfaction with the “leap into the dark” by resorting to
the lex fori as often as possible. [39]
It is clear that a general and unlimited application of the lex fori,
notwithstanding the foreign elements of the case of whichever quantity and of
whichever quality, would practically eliminate the conflicts law issue. It would
also renounce, however, the ideal of conformity of judgements in different
jurisdictions and would open the door for forum shopping. A general lex
fori-prorogation is incompatible with the principle iura novit curia
and renounces the axiom of Savigny’s system that it is the law that
rules the cases and not the parties. Whilst the private autonomy is being
controlled in many respects in the substantive law per iustitiam
commutativam, the party autonomy in cases with foreign elements can not be
permitted to unfold itself unrestictedly. Neither the German nor the Swiss law
have ever seriously considered to go this far. It must be noticed,
though, that it is a step into this direction when both private international
laws acknowledge to quite an extent the party autonomy in determining the
applicable law ( lex
voluntatis). [40]
The so-called “better law”-approach which has been
promulgated in the U.S.A. particularly by Cavers, Leflar and
Juenger[41] and which is very much akin
to the lex fori preference (most lawyers will find the better law at
home) has also scarcely found support in Germany and Switzerland. The main
reason is that neither the judge nor the parties can reliably decide which one
of the legal systems in question possesses the optimal qualities to justly
decide upon the case. The “better law”-approach would entail a
radical breach of the classical system of private international law, because it
gives up the fiction of equality of all legal systems and presupposes or claims
the existence of a reliable standard to assess the quality of a law. Such a
standard, however, is not in sight. Certainly, it is the task and the aim of the
substantive national laws to search for a better quality of the normative order
to achieve the ends and to pursue the interests of justice in accordance with
the nation’s values and principles. What is suitable for one legal
culture, however, is not necessarily apt for the other and vice versa.
6 Refinement and flexibility
- The challenge by the constitution
The sixth common experience which Germany and Switzerland have
made in their codification process of the private international law is that only
a piecemeal and cumbersome strategy of refinement and flexibility of the
conflicts rules can lead to a convincing success. The attacks against the
fundaments of the classical private international law have been rebuffed. The
architecture of the system of private international law was nevertheless subject
not only to minor repairs of the facades, but also to some supporting new
constructions. No conceptional purism could be sustained; compromises had to be
made. A complete revolution and new fondation of private international law has
not taken place, but an evolutionary development altered the structures of
private international law eventually quite remarkably.
The beginning of this development is probably marked by the
growing awareness that private international law needs a constitutional
foundation in the sense that it must be fully in accordance with a
country’s constitution or basic law. In Germany the issue of conformity of
certain conflict rules with the basic law (the German constitution) came up very
early after the second war. In the international family law considerations of
substantive law entered the discussion, when the constitutionallity of some
provisions of the EGBGB was questioned. [42] The
constitutional provisions in the catalogue of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, like equality of gender and protection of family, demanded adherence
also in the field of private international law and prevented, in particular,
paternalistic, sexually biased conflict rules. The constitution is after all the
supreme law of the land, and it is also supreme to a country’s private
international law. This has expressly been stated by the German Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1971 [43]
and later on, and led to the annullation of some statutory provisions in the
former version of the EGBGB. [44] In
Switzerland, it was never questioned that the Swiss Federal Constitution was the
paramount source of law. [45]
In today’s private international law codifications of
Germany and Switzerland the conflict rules of international family law are fully
in accordance with the pertinent constitutional provisions on non-discrimination
and equality. It must not be overlooked that these developments had a manifest
and manifold tendency towards the integration of value considerations into the
private international law. It is no longer and not alone the determination of
the geographically better law that governs private international law
unreservedly and independently from substantive value judgements. Due to this
development towards a constitutional undercoat of the conflict of laws rules it
has been said: “The private international law has lost its
innocence.” [46]
- Substantive law considerations
The development went farther: The so-called
“modern” (as opposed to “classical”) private
international law, which had developed, in essence, in an evolutionary way
during the decades after the war, albeit under the constant threat of radical
and revolutionary changes, can be characerized as follows: the original severity
of its forms has been mitigated; the previous strictness of its structures has
been moderatd; the former rigidity of the rules has been loosened; the old
crampedness of the principles has been broken. The conflict rules on the
applicable law and the connecting factors, like domicile, habitual residence,
nationality, locus contractus, locus rei sitae, locus delicti commissi
and so on, have become decidedly more diverse and flexible than before. The
considerations, which justify and legitimate the determination of the applicable
law, have become by far more complex than previously. In fact, the times where
the determination of the applicable law led to a risky “leap into the
dark” are over.
The substantive laws concerned were always taken into
consideration to a certain extent, even by the clasical conflicts lawyer,
e.g. when he loosened the rigidity of the priciple locus regit
actum by the favor negotii or favor validitatis in the
international law of legal transactions to uphold the validity of a certain
contract. Likewise in the law of torts respectively delicts the favor
laesi, or in child custody cases the favor legitimitatis or favor
infantis required a comparison of the substantive laws to achieve the
priviledge of certain persons and thus to pursue certain substantive objectives
in accordance with the national lawgiver. It was always emphasized, though, that
these cases are only exceptions and never the rule, otherwise the System of
Savigny would be catalysed.
The question is, of course, how far can you go and make
exceptions without eroding and eventually abolishing the rule. The German and
the Swiss private international law as they are codified today in the EGBGB and
the IPRG go fairly far, so that the danger of an erosion of the Savignyan
system sometimes appears at the horizon. The most prominent example is perhaps
the international law of delicts, where a differentiated modification of the
connecting factors has been introduced to determine the applicable
law. [47] The traditional and exclusive
connection of all delictual questions to the locus delicti commissi has
for long been given up. Many efforts have been made in the last decades to shape
preferable connecting factors which honour the sociological circumstances of a
delict or the interest in the protection of the infringed legal positions. It
has been recognized that different types of delicts like road accidents, product
liability, delicts in familiy relationships, delicts in competition cases and so
on had to be dealt with differently. As a result the old concept of lex loci
delicti commissi today serves only as a subsidiary category, where no closer
relationship of the factual pattern with a certain legal system can be
established. The common personal statute, the connection of a delict to a
contractual obligation or to a family relationship, but also a later choice of
law by the parties can form such a closer
relationship. [48]
The discussion about diversity and flexibility has soon been
extended to more and more fields of law. The international law of the right to
the use of a name, the international law of the act of marrying, of the effects
of a marriage, of the divorce of a marriage, the law of child custody and
maintenance, particularly the international law of contract and the
international company law have seen an increasing refinement and diversification
of their connecting factors. The private international law theorists requested
more and more special connecting factors to better suit the individual cases.
So-called scales of connecting factors have been worked out and sophisticated
exeption clauses, elaborate evasion clauses and intricate escape clauses have
been designed. The escape clause in Art. 28 sec. 5 EGBGB with the recourse to
the closest connection of a contract with another state is but one example. Even
with regard to the international law of
property [49] the principle of lex rei
sitae has been supplemented by special rules for means of transport with or
for import goods or for goods passing through a country ( res in
transitu). In addition, the admissibility of choice of law by the parties
has celebrated a grand victory in many fields of private international law. The
idea of a relatively simple and concise private international law systems has
fully collapsed.
The law of conflict of laws has enormously gained refinement,
flexibility, diversity and sophistication. Yet the other side of the medal must
also be noticed: It is quite obvious that the certainty and forseeablility of
the determination of the applicable law has suffered, and so has the old ideal
of an international hamony of judgements in the sense of a conformity of
judgements notwithstanding the jurisdiction. Scales of connecting factors and
alternative applications like the ones in Art. 5 sec. 1 or Art. 10 secs. 2 and 5
EGBGB may serve well as instruments of politics, but hardly promote the idea of
conformity of judgements. Substantive tasks are undoubtedly being pursued also
by the scale of connecting factors in Art. 18 EGBGB according to which, with
regard to the obligation to pay maintenace, the law of the habitual residence,
the law of the comon personal statute and finally the lex fori applies
(with a reservation for German debtors domiciled in Germany); the dangers of
such an over-flexibiliy, however, are at hand.
In summary, modern private international law in Germany and in
Switzerland has opened itself carefully for the tendencies of incorporation of
substantive legal considerations. The law of conflict of laws was recognized as
constituting “also a reflecting image of substantive legal value
judgements of its time” (“auch Spiegelbild sachrechtlicher Wertungen
seiner Zeit”). [50] In principle, however,
the traditional mechanisim of private international law remains preserved. The
strategy of the “modernists” is differentiation and flexibilisation
of the conflict rules, but not substitution of those rules by mere policy
considerations, by vague "approaches", "choice-influencing considerations" or
"principles of preference", as it was the case formerly in the USA, where
meanwhile also a renaissance of the Savigny/Story-approach has taken
place. [51]
7 The “second pillar” of private international law
7.1 Mandatory intervention norms of civil law
Another - the seventh - common experience of German and
Swiss private international laws is the increasing importance of what is known
in the international theoretical discussion as lois d’application
immédiate or law of direct applicability. Modern private
international law in Germany and in Switzerland has also experienced the
emergence and growing significance of an independent field of conflicts law
which followed its own rules, namely the area of international economic law in
the sense of regulating law appertaining both to public and to private
law. [52] Here the doctrine of lois
d’application immédiate governs. In fact we observe since many
years a “splitting” or a “duality” of private
international law: On the one hand we find the traditional, “purely”
private fields of law (like the law of succession) and on the other hand we see
the fields of economic regulation through private law ( e.g. the law of
competition), the latter forming a “second
pillar” [53] of conflicts
law. [54]
The problem as such had already been discerned by
Savigny who recognized in his system of private international law an
inevitable sphere of exceptions, which he described as „law of strictly
positive, imperative nature” ("von streng positiver, zwingender
Natur"). [55] His general conflict rules should
not be applied with respect to statutes „which bear a political, a
police-related or an economic character“ (die "einen politischen, einen
polizeilichen oder einen volkswirtschaftlichen Charakter an sich tragen"). In
German and Swiss private international law this type of norms is called
„zwingende Eingriffsnormen“ or „mandatory intervention
norms“ [56], which the state employs to
regulate private relationships in the public common interest pursueing
socio-economic tasks, hereby restricting the individual feedom of private
persons. [57] It is clear that these
intervention norms have to be applied anyway, when they belong to the national
legal order which forms the lex causae for the private legal relationshp
in question. In case of intervention norms of the forum state the
application can be justified - at least in “urgent” cases - by
(“positive”) ordre public. The crucial point is reached, however,
where an intervention norm of a third state demands for application and
where this third state is neither the forum state nor the lex causae
state.
Those intervention norms have at first been identified with
regard to the law of foreign currencies [58] and
later on the law of cartels and restrictive trade practices. A prerequisite of
the “immediate application” is, of course, that the norm itself
demands for an application independently from the applicable substantive law and
that the intervening state has a respectable interest in the application. This
approach can, of course, lead to a division of the same contractual relationship
into one part for the purely private matters and one part for the socio-economic
functions of the contract. The reognition of intervention norms was originally
restricted to those of the forum state, but it was later more and more
extended to those of third states, although hesitantly and not unanimously. In
France a similar development took place, and the terminology in Germany and
Switzerland follows today the usage in France: lois d'application
immédiate[59], norms which demand
for a direct and extraterritorial application indepedently from the customary
conflict rules. Those norms, although they belong to the substantive law,
contain expressly or impliedly a unilateral conflict rule.
7.2 The path to recognition
The idea of law of immediate application was as such never
totally foreign to the private international law, which is easily exemplified by
the treatment of nationality of the form of legal transactions ( locus regit
formam). The new feature is, however, the importance of the law of immediate
application for the ever widening field of socio-economically regulating law
intervening in private relationships. This type of norms did not matter so much
hundrerd years ago: According to the understanding of the classical liberal
private international law, the responsibily for the ecomomy was put on the
citizens of the civilian society, which could avail themselves of the private
law as an instrument for their autonomous and decentralized planning and acting.
By contrast, the modern state in a mixed economy tends to instrumentalize the
institutions of the private law for his regulating purposes, for instance to
secure a workable competition, or to shelter the national currency, or to
protect consumers and workers, or to exert export controll, or to push through
price regulations, or to guarantee workers’ co-determination. In modern
states the “pure” public law of the governing state and the
“pure” private law of the acting citizens denote only models and
extremes, whereas the bulk of existing norms is located in between. Despite many
disputes about this kind of law is constitutes the predomonant challange of
private international law at the turn of the millenium.
[60]
The danger of an undue extension of the lois
d’application immédiate is obvious, since there are relatively
few fields of private law without any interventionistic background, be it the
protection of the weaker party or simply the maintenance of the
peace. [61] The decision about the consideration
and recognition of the règles d'application immédiate turns
the classical approach of private international law upside down, in that it
allocates factual patterns to legal norms instead of the other way round. This
decision is, moreover, itself often a political decision. The private
internaional lawyer cannot escape the problem by simply calling it a problem of
public international law. This just raises the new problem of
characterization of the systematical categories of “private” or
“public” law and is highly unsatisfactory, because the distinction
between private and public law is itself highy questionable and unclear.
The theory of lois d´application immédiate
has been fully recognized in the Swiss private international law codification of
1989 in artt. 18 and 19, according to which intervention norms of the forum
state, the lex causae state and also a third state can be applied. The
German private international law codification does not go so far, although the
Rome Convention of the European member states of 1980 about the harmonization of
the applicable law for contractual obligations opened in its art. 7 sec. 1 the
possibility to give effect “to the mandatory rules of the law of another
country”. The parallel provision of art. 34 of the German EGBGB which
entered into force in 1986 does not mention the application of
intervention norms of third states, which is due to a reservation Germany has
made to art. 7 sec. 1 of the Rome Convention. Nevertheless it can be statet that
the duality of the two pillars of the law of conflict of laws is in principle
ackowledged both in Germany and in Switzerland.
7.3 Universal conflict rules for the intervention
norms?
It is still an unresolved issue, however, whether the
unilateral conflict rules which are inherent in the intervenional law can be
extended to universal conflict rules for the intervention norms of immediate
application. In the interest of conformity of judgements independenly from the
state of jurisdiction a system of universal rules of conflicts of intervention
norms is, of course, highly desirable. [62]
Nevertheless, the international discussion is far away from this goal. It is the
so-called comity, the principle of friendliness among civilized peoples and
nations, which decides about the mutual application of intervention
norms, [63] particularly in the field of
international competition law. [64] The problem
is that the states, when enacting intervention norms, still employ fairly
different political strategies and concepts based on different convictions.
Undoubtedly the sovereignty of the national states is here the big issue behind
it all. The globalisation and the deregulation movement only partly mitigates
this problem. Conventions only provide for help among relatively homogeneous
states. Beyond conventions comity will perhaps in the course of time evolve into
a sound basis for the architecture of a system of universal conflict rules for
intervention norms.
The field of „mixed“ private-public law with
„social“ or „economic“ norms which serve both public and
private interests, does not force a departure from the modern private
international law with its flexible conflict rules, as long as the
interventionist character of the norms in question does not prevail. There are
many fields of private law, particularly in the family law and the law of
succession, which are relatively free from public political interferences and
belong to a field of law unsuspected to be influenced by socio-economic
deliberations. [65] The erection of the second
pillar of private international law supplementing and flanking the existing
modern system of conflict rules is confined to the law with a prevailing
intervention character. [66]
8 Conclusions
Summarizing the common experiences which Germany and
Switzerland have made in shaping the codifications of their private
international law one can recall and enlist the following seven
points:
- The conceptual conflicts of law approach of Savigny forms, in
principle, a sound and sturdy fundament. Both private international law
codifications, the German EGBGB and the Swiss IPRG, are deeply and firmly rooted
in the Savignyan tradition. In fact, they confirm the soundness of this
approach in principle.
- The Savignyan approach reveals, however, some
obvious deficiencies and weaknesses and remains in some respects unsatisfactory
(“leap into the dark”; lack of substantive value considerations).
- A radical change towards a decidedly and expressly political approach like
the governmental interest analysis approach constitutes no convincing
alternative, but only leads back to the medieval theory of statutes. Detailed
black letter rules are preferable to open-ended provisions stating only choice
influencing considerations.
- The general resort to the lex fori does
not offer a promising relief.
- The search for the “better law”
can not be considered a guidance towards a viable conflicts law theory.
- A
departure from the formalistic understanding of private international law and
from its restriction to the “blind” determination of the applicable
law is inevitable. Compromises have to be made which lead to an increasing
consideration of substantive law aspects and of value judgements in addition to
ordre public. Only a piecemeal and cumbersome strategy of differentiation,
refinement, sophistication and flexibilisation of the conflicts rules with their
connecting factors can lead to a convincing success.
- The modern private
international law must pay full respect to the changed functions of economically
motivated and oriented private law which demands for an immediate application of
intervention norms irrespective of the lex causae (lois
d’application immédiate). The growing importance of this
public-private law requests a “second pillar” of private
international law.
These seven points of experience which are the result of
decades of changing developments in Germany and Switzerland seem to me so
fundamental and important that I am tempted to speak - whilst we were dealing
with “pillars” - of the seven pillars of wisdom in the field
of private international law. They are topped by the latest common experience,
namely that it is indeed feasible to draft and finally enact a codification of a
nation’s private international law in a fairly satisfactory way. In both
countries the codes are successfully in practice for more than a decade and have
led to very few difficulties of application. Whether all those experiences
tantamount to an advice and recommendation to other countries (for instance to
China) to act accordingly [67] – that must
be left to further discussion.
[*] Professor Dr.iur.
Dr.rer.publ. Michael Martinek, M.C.J.(New York) holds a chair for Civil
Law and Commercial Law, Comparative Law and Private International Law at
University of Saarland, Saarbruecken, Germany, and is a frequent visitor to
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, P.R.China. He gratefully
ackowledges the preparatory work for this contribution by his assistant Dr. Chen
Weizuo.
[1] See Huang Jin (ed.),
Guoji Sifa (Private International Law), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 1999,
163 – 169; Chinese Society of Private International Law, Model Law of
Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China (Sixth Draft),
Publishing House of Law, Beijing 2000, 2 – 5.
[2] For a short introduction to
German private international law (in English) see Siehr, in:
Ebke/Finkin (eds.), Introduction into the German Law, 1996, 337 (this
contribution stems from 1996 and could, therefore, not cover the latest
developments and the amendments made in 1999 to the Introductory Act ). For all
the details of the German private international law it is advisable to consult
one of the major treatises or commentaries, e.g. Kegel/Schurig,
Internationales Privatrecht, 8 th ed. 2000; von Hoffmann,
Internationales Privatrecht, 6 th ed. 2000; von Bar,
Internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 1, 1987 and Vol. 2, 1991; Rauscher,
Internationales Privatrecht, Schaeffers Grundriss des Rechts und der Wirtschaft,
1999; Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Vol. 10, EGBGB,
3 rd ed. 1998.
[4] Cf. Neuhaus,
Empfiehlt sich eine Kodifizierung des Internationalen Privatrechts?, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 37 (1973), 453; Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Reform
des deutschen internationalen Personen-, Familien- und Erbrechts des Deutschen
Rats für Internationales Privatrecht, 1981; Kühne, IPR-Gesetz,
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des internationalen Privat- und
Verfahrensrechts, 1980; cf. also the draft for a private international
law codification prepared by Neuhaus and Kropholler for the
Max-Planck-Institut in Hamburg and the reform guidelines for a new codification
formulated by a working group of the institute, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 44
(1980), 325.
[5] For details of this
historical developments see Martinek, Wissenschaftsgeschichte der
Rechtsvergleichung und des Internationalen Privatrechts in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik -
Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Jurisprudenz, 1994, 529.
[6] Gesetz zur Neuregelung des
IPR vom 25.7.1986, BGBl. I/1986, 1142; cf. Böhmer, Das
deutsche Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts von 1986, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 50 (1986), 646; Jayme, Das neue IPR-Gesetz -
Brennpunkte der Reform, in: IPRax – Praxis des Internationalen Privat-
und Verfahrensrechts 1986, 265; Basedow, Die Neuregelung des
Internationalen Privat- und Prozeßrechts, in: Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 1986, 2971; Wengler, Zur Technik der
internationalprivatrechtlichen Rechtsanwendungsanweisungen des
IPR-"Reform"gesetzes von 1986, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 53 (1989), 409;
Lüderitz, Internationales Privatrecht im Übergang -
Theoretische und praktische Aspekte der deutschen Reform, in: Festschrift
für Kegel II, 1987, 343.
[7] Gesetz zum IPR für
außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse und das Sachenrecht vom
21.5.1999, BGBl. I, 1026.
[8] Cf.
Matscher/Siehr/Delbrück, Multilaterale Staatsverträge erga
omnes und deren Inkorporation in nationale IPR-Kodifikationen - Vor- und
Nachteile einer solchen Rezeption, 1986.
[9] Cf.
Deckert/Lilienthal, Die Rechtssetzungkompetenz der EG im Privatrecht, in:
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 1999, 121; Basedow, Die
Harmonisierung des Kollisionsrechts nach dem Vertrag von Amsterdam, in:
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 609.
[10] Bundesgesetz über
das Internationale Privatrecht (IPRG) vom 18. Dezember 1987 – Loi
féderale sur le droit international privé (LDIP) du 18
décembre 1987; for an overall view cf. Schnyder, Das neue
IPR-Gesetz, 2nd ed. 1990; Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s
Private International Law, 2nd ed. 1994; cf. also: Lausanner Kolloquium
über den deutschen und den schweizerischen Gesetzesentwurf zur Neuregelung
des Internationalen Privatrechts, Veröffentlichungen des Schweizerischen
Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung Bd. 1, Zürich 1984; Overbeck,
Der schweizerische Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über das internationale
Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 42 (1978), 601; Bundesgesetz über
das internationale Privatrecht (IPR-Gesetz), Schlussbericht der
Expertenkommission zum Gesetzesentwurf, Schweizer Studien zum internationalen
Recht, Bd. 13, 1997; Honsell/Vogt/Schnyder (eds.), Kommentar zum
schweizerischen Privatrecht, IPR, 1996; Keller/Siehr, Einführung in
die Eigenart des internationalen Privatrechts, 3rd ed. 1984.
[11] Bundesgesetz betreffend
die zivilrechtlichen Verhältnisse der Niedergelassenen und Aufenthalter
(NAG) vom 25. Juni 1891.
[12] Schnyder, Das
neue IPR-Gesetz, 2nd ed. 1990, 4.
[13] See Chen Weizuo,
Ruishi Guofi Yanjiu (A Study of the Swiss Code on Private International Law),
Publishing House of Law, Beijing 1998. This book by Dr. Chen Weizuo is
the first monography published in China relating to the Swiss codification on
private international law.
[14]
Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s Private International Law,
2nd ed. 1994, 12.
[15] Savigny,
System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Band VIII, 1849, 28 (reprint
Darmstadt 1956): „daß bei jedem Rechtsverhältniß
dasjenige Rechtsgebiet aufgesucht werde, welchem dieses
Rechtsverhältniß seiner eigenthümlichen Natur nach angehört
oder unterworfen ist (worin dasselbe seinen Sitz hat)".
[16] Cf. Neuhaus,
Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 366: „kopernikanische
Wende“.
[17] Leo Raape,
Internationales Privatrecht, 5th ed., 1961, 90.
[18] Cf.
Kegel, Angleichung des Rechts in Europa, Kölner Schriften zum
Europarecht Vol. 11 (1971), 13, 39; Börner, Rechtsangleichung als
Interessenangleichung - Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, in: Festschrift
für Kegel, 1977, 381.
[19] Cf. Neuhaus,
Die Zukunft des Internationalen Privatrechts, in: Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis Vol. 160 (1961), 493; Neuhaus, Abschied von
Savigny?, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 46 (1982), 4; see also the first
volume of Rabels Zeitschrift after the war (1949/50) where the editors
celebrated „in deep respect and gratitude“ ("in Ehrfurcht und
Dankbarkeit") the hundredth anniversary of "Savigny's 8th volume“, Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 361; see also Neuhaus, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 381, who stated that Savignys
thoughts are in many respects outdated, but „his programme is in a deeper
sense still valid today“ ("sein Programm gilt in vertieftem Sinn auch
heute noch").
[20] See von Bar,
Internationales Privatrecht Vol. I (1987), 367.
[21] Cf.
Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im internationalen Privatrecht. Zur neueren
Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Kollisionsrechts, in: Festschrift für Leo
Raape, 1948, 35; cf. also the critical assessment by Lewald, in:
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1948, 644.
[22] Neuhaus,
Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, in: Rabels Zeitschrift
Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 366.
[23] Cf. Beitzke,
Betrachtungen zur Methodik im Internationalprivatrecht, in: Festschrift für
Rudolf Smend, 1952, 1; Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im
internationalen Privatrecht, in: Festschrift für Lewald, 1953, 259, 270.
[24] See Dölle,
Gegenwärtige Aufgaben der deutschen Wissenschaft vom IPR, in:
Gegenwartsfragen des IPR (5th supplement to Deutsche Richterzeitung), 1948,
3.
[25] Cf. Currie,
Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in: Duke Law Journal
1959, 171; Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,
1963.
[26] Cf. Siehr,
in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 585, 586.
[27] See Heini,
Neuere Strömungen im amerikanischen internationalen Privatrecht, in:
Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht Vol. 19 (1962), 31;
Vischer, Die Kritik an der herkömmlichen Methode des Internationalen
Privatrechts, in: Festschrift für Oscar Germann, 1969, 287.
[28] Rodolfo De
Nova, Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws, Recueil
des Cours Vol. 118 (1966-II), 435 and 599.
[29] Cf.
Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws", in: Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 37
(1948/49), 483; see also Kronstein, Recht und wirtschaftliche
Macht, 1962.
[30] Cf. Neuhaus,
Deutsche Richterzeitung 1948, 86; Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of
Laws", in: Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 37 (1948/49), 483; Wengler, Die
allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze des Internationalen Privatrechts und ihre
Kollision, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 1943/44, 473;
see also Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 1971,
169.
[31] See e.g.
Kronstein, Das Recht der internationalen Kartelle, 1967, 239.
[32] Wiethölter,
Vorbemerkungen zum IPR, in: Internationales Nachlaßverfahrensrecht,
Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Reform des deutschen internationalen
Erbrechts, 1969, 142; Wiethölter, in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt
1967, 465 (book review); Wiethölter, Begriffs- und
Interessenjurisprudenz - falsche Fronten im IPR, in: Festschrift für Kegel,
1977, 213, 224, 233, 239, 260; Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des
Kollisionsrechts, 1971, 4; Joerges, Die klassische Konzeption des
Internationalen Privatrechts und das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 421, 423; Joerges,
Vorüberlegungen zu einer Theorie des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 43 (1979), 6.
[33] Cf. Neuhaus,
Neue Wege im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 35 (1971), 401, 417.
[34] Jayme, Zur
Krise des "Governmental-Interest Approach“, in: Festschrift für
Kegel, 1977, 359; Kegel, Vaterhaus und Traumhaus. Herkömmliches
internationales Privatrecht und Hauptthesen der amerikanischen Reformer, in:
Festschrift für Günther Beitzke, 1979, 551; Neuhaus, Neue Wege
im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 35
(1971), 401; Neuhaus, Entwicklungen im Allgemeinen Teil des
Internationalen Privatrechts, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 23; E.
Lorenz, Zur Struktur des internationalen Privatrechts - Ein Beitrag zur
Reformdiskussion, 1977; Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht, 1981,
51.
[35] Cf. Simitis,
Internationales Arbeitsrecht - Standort und Perspektiven, in: Festschrift
für Kegel, 1977, 153.
[36] Cf.
Kropholler, Das kollisionsrechtliche System des Schutzes der
schwächeren Vertragspartei, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 42 (1978), 634.
[37] See E. Lorenz,
Zur Struktur des internationalen Privatrechts - Ein Beitrag zur
Reformdiskussion, 1977, 107.
[38] Neuhaus,
Neue Wege im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 35 (1971), 401, 417.
[39] Cf. Albert E.
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in Conflict of Laws, Michigan Law
Review Vol. 58 (1959/60), 637; Ehrenzweig, Wirklichkeiten einer
Lex-Fori-Theorie, in: Festschrift für Wilhelm Wengler, Vol. II, 1973, 251;
Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the
Lex-Fori-Approach, Oklahoma Law Review Vol. 18 (1965), 340; cf. also
Siehr, Ehrenzweigs lex-fori-Theorie und ihre Bedeutung für das
amerikanische und deutsche Kollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34
(1970), 585.
[40] Cf.
Flessner, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34
(1970), 547; Sturm, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht - Notwendigkeit und
Grenzen, in: Festschrift für Zweigert, 1981, 329; Sturm, Der Name
der Ehefrau aus kollisionsrechtlicher Sicht, in: Zeitschrift für
Familienrecht 1973, 397, 405 with footnote 118; Simitis, Über die
Entscheidungsfindung im IPR, Standesamt Zeitschrift 1976, 6, 14;
Müller-Graff, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht im internationalen
Wettbewerbsrecht?, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 48 (1984), 289.
[41] Cf. David F.
Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 2 nd ed. 1966; Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, Recueil des Cours 1970-III,
75; Scoles/Hay, Conflicts, 31; Robert A. Leflar, American
Conflicts Law, 1968, 243 to 265; Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations, in: Conflicts Law, New York University Law Review Vol. 41
(1966), 267; Leflar, Conflicts Law, More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, California Law Review Vol. 54 (1966), 1584; Friedrich K.
Juenger, Zum Wandel des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1974, 21;
Juenger, Möglichkeiten einer Neuorientierung des internationalen
Privatrechts, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1973, 1521; Juenger,
American and European Conflicts Law, in: American Journal of Comparative Law
Vol. 30 (1982), 117.
[42] See e.g.
Dölle, Die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau im Familienrecht, in:
Festgabe für E. Kaufmann, 1950, 39; Braga, Die Gleichberechtigung
von Mann und Frau und das deutsche internationale Privatrecht, in: Monatsschrift
für Deutsches Recht 1952, 266; Makarov, Die Gleichberechtigung der
Frau und das Internationale Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 17 (1952),
382, 451; Neuhaus, Zur zivilrechtlichen Gleichstellung der Ehefrau
außerhalb des BGB, in: Juristenzeitung 1952, 523;
Müller-Freienfels, Scheidungsstatut und Gleichberechtigung, in:
Juristenzeitung 1957, 141; Siegrist, Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau
und internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 24 (1959), 54;
Kegel, Reform des deutschen internationalen Eherechts, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 25 (1960), 201; Gamillscheg, Gleichberechtigung der Frau
und Reform des Internationalen Eherechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 33 (1969),
654; Lüderitz, Erneut - Gleichberechtigung im internationalen
Eherecht, in: Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 1970, 169.
[43] Bundesverfassungsgericht,
Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerGE 31, 58 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1971, 1509; cf. Jochem, in: Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 1975, 302:
„Judgement of the century“ (Jahrhundertentscheidung); cf.
Henrich, Die Bedeutung der Grundrechte bei der Anwendung fremden Rechts, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 2; Jayme, Grundrecht der
Eheschließungsfreiheit und Wiederheirat geschiedener Ausländer, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 19; Kegel, Embarras de Richesse, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 27; Lüderitz, Grundgesetz contra
Internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 35;
Makarov, Art. 6 I Grundgesetz und die Anwendung spanischen Rechts, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 54 ff; Klaus Müller, Deutsches
Scheidungsurteil als prozessuale Vorfrage und fremder ordre public, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 60; K. H. Neumayer, Zur Zivilehe eines
Spaniers mit einer geschiedenen Deutschen, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36
(1972), 73; Siehr, Grundrecht der Eheschließungsfreiheit und
Internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 93;
Wengler, Die Bedeutung der verfassungsrechtlichen Bestimmungen über
die Eheschließungsfreiheit und den Schutz der Familie für das
Internationale Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 116;
Neuhaus, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Internationales Privatrecht, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 127; Müller-Freienfels,
"Spanierheiraten" Geschiedener im Meinungsstreit, in: Festschrift für
Kegel, 1977, 55.
[44] See
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerfGE 63, 181 = Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1983, 1968 and Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. 1983 I, 525;
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerfGE 68, 384 =
Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, 1282 and Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. 1985 I, 573;
Bundesverfassungsgericht, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1986, 658;
Bundesgerichtshof, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BGHZ 86, 57.
[45]
Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s Private International Law,
2nd ed. 1994, 11.
[46] Lüderitz,
Anknüpfung im Parteiinteresse, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 31:
"Das Internationale Privatrecht hat seine Unschuld verloren."
[47] Binder, Zur
Auflockerung des Deliktsstatuts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 20 (1955), 401;
Beitzke, Les obligations délictuelles en droit international
privé, Recueil des Cours 115, 1965-II, 65; Kropholler, Ein
Anknüpfungssystem für das Deliktsstatut, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol.
33 (1969), 601; Jayme, Die Familie im Recht der unerlaubten Handlungen,
1971, 269; Stoll, Anknüpfungsgrundsätze bei der Haftung
für Straßenverkehrsunfälle und der Produktenhaftung nach der
neueren Entwicklung des internationalen Deliktsrechts, in: Festschrift für
Kegel, 1977, 113, 133;
[48] Kropholler,
Ein Anknüpfungssystem für das Deliktsstatut, in: Rabels Zeitschrift
Vol. 33 (1969), 601, 639; Flessner, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht, in:
Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 545, 568.
[49] Cf. Drobnig,
Entwicklungstendenzen des deutschen internationalen Sachenrechts, in:
Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 141.
[50] Keller/Siehr,
Einführung in die Eigenart des internationalen Privatrechts, 3rd ed. 1984,
124.
[51] See
Bodenheimer, Norm und Ermessen in der Entwicklung des amerikanischen
internationalen Privatrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 51 (1987),
1.
[52] Cf. Drobnig,
Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52
(1988), 1; see also Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht -
Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates,
in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8.
[53] Cf.
Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987, 59.
[54] Cf. Drobnig,
Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52
(1988), 1, 7; see also Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht -
Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates,
in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8, 9.
[55] Savigny,
System des heutige Römischen Rechts, Vol. VIII, 1849, 32 pp.
[56] Karl
Neumeyer, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht Vol., 1936, 228 pp., 243 pp.;
Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1st ed.
1962, 58 and 2nd ed. 1976, 33 ( § 4 II), who, in contrast to
Neumeyer, emphasises that the concept of „Eingriffsnormen“
(intervention norms) is not confined to the field public administrative law.
[57] Schulte, Die
Anknüpfung von Eingriffsnormen, insbesondere wirtschaftlicher Art, im
internationalen Vertragsrecht, 1975; F. A. Mann, Eingriffsgesetze und
IPR, in: Festschrift für Wahl, 1973, 139; Drobnig, Die Beachtung von
ausländischen Eingriffsgesetzen - eine Interessenanalyse, in: Festschrift
für Neumayer, 1985, 159; Kreuzer, Ausländisches
Wirtschaftsrecht vor deutschen Gerichten. Zum Einfluss fremdstaatlicher
Eingriffsnormen auf privatrechtliche Rechtsgeschäfte, 1986; Siehr,
Ausländische Eingriffsnormen im inländischen
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 41;
Drobnig, Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 1, 4; Mestmäcker, Staatliche
Souveränität und offene Märkte - Konflikte bei der
extraterritorialen Anwendung von Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol.
52 (1988), 205.
[58] Wengler, Die
allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze des IPR und ihre Kollisionen, in: Zeitschrift
für öffentliches Recht Vol. 23 (1943/44), 473; Wengler, Die
Anknüpfung des zwingenden Schuldrechts im IPR, in: Zeitschrift für
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft Vol. 54 (1941), 168; Wengler, Über
die Maxime von der Unanwendbarkeit ausländischer politischer Gesetze, in:
Internationales Recht und Diplomatie 1956, 191; Wengler, Sonderanknüpfung,
positiver und negativer ordre public, in: Juristenzeitung 1979, 175;
Zweigert, Nichterfüllung aufgrund ausländischer
Leistungsverbote, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 14 (1942), 283; Zweigert,
Internationales Privatrecht und öffentliches Recht, in: Fünfzig Jahre
Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, 1965,
124.
[59] See
Schwander, Lois d'application immédiate, Sonderanknüpfung,
IPR-Sachnormen und andere Ausnahmen von der gewöhnlichen Anknüpfung im
internationalen Privatrecht, 1975; Kegel, Die selbstgerechte Sachnorm,
in: Gedächtnisschrift für Albert A. Ehrenzweig, 1976, 51.
[60] Cf. e.g.
Rehbinder, Extraterritoriale Wirkungen des deutschen Kartellrechts, 1965,
286; Schwartz, Deutsches Internationales Kartellrecht, 1962, 221;
Heiz, Das fremde öffentliche Recht im internationalen
Kollisionsrecht, 1958; Mertens, Ausländisches Kartellrecht im
deutschen internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 31 (1967),
385; Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht vor deutschen
Gerichten, 1986; Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachnorm, 1981, 138;
Schurig, Zwingendes Recht, "Eingriffsnormen und neues IPR, in: Rabels
Zeitschrift Vol. 54 (1990), 217; Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht -
Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates,
in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8; Mestmäcker, Staatliche
Souveränität und offene Märkte - Konflikte bei der
extraterritorialen Anwendung von Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol.
52 (1988), 205; Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987;
Veelken, Interessenabwägung im Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 1988;
Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Sonderanknüpfung und
extraterritoriale Anwendung wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung von Marktrecht, 1990; Habermeier, Neue Wege zum
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Eine Bestandsaufnahme prävalenter
wirtschaftskollisionsrechtlicher Methodologie unter dem Blickwinkel des
kritischen Rationalismus, 1997.
[61] Cf. von
Hoffmann, Über den Schutz des Schwächeren bei internationalen
Schuldverträgen, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 38 (1974), 396, 410
pp.
[62] See Basedow,
Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Theoretischer Versuch über die
ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, in: Rabels Zeischrift Vol. 52
(1988), 8, who is decidedly in favour of unilateral conflict rules in the field
of economically regulating norms.
[63] Zweigert,
Internationales Privatrecht und öffentliches Recht, in: 50 Jahre Institut
für internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, 1965,
124.
[64] See
Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987 and (contradicting)
Mestmäcker, in: Rabels Zeitschrift 52 (1988), 205, 219; see
also Veelken, Interessenabwägung im Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht,
1988; Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 1990; Habermeier, Neue
Wege zum Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Eine Bestandsaufnahme prävalenter
wirtschaftskollisionsrechtlicher Methodologie unter dem Blickwinkel des
kritischen Rationalismus, 1997.
[65] Heini, Der
Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über das Internationale Privat- und
Zivilprozessrecht (IPR-Gesetz), in: Schweizerische Juristenzeitung Vol. 74
(1978), 249, 256, who, in footnote 29, speaks of the „field unsuspected of
interventions by social policy“ („sozialpolitisch
unverdächtiger Bereich“).
[66] Rehbinder,
Zur Politisierung des IPR, in: Juristenzeitung 1973, 151, 156.
[67] Compare e.g. Huang
Jin (ed.), Guoji Sifa (Private International Law), Publishing House of Law,
Beijing 1999, 163 – 169; Chinese Society of Private International Law,
Model Law of Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Sixth Draft), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 2000, 39 - 86.
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